Township of Etna, Ohio 43018-8000, Hillview Estates, P. O. Box 5, Official, Mailing Address, Brending, LLC


Republican Party of Cuyahoga County | Contact <!--[if lte IE 6]> <![endif]
<!-- JV - This comment removes Joomla's entire default header:

Cuyahoga County Republican Party Open Source Content Management

Nav view search

Navigation

Search




Your input is very important to us!

Our strength is in our diversity, and we welcome citizens from all backgrounds and walks of life. If you have any questions, or for more information on becoming a member of the Republican Party of Cuyahoga County, please contact our headquarters at the numbers below.
Phone: (216) 621-5415
Fax: (216) 621-1841
Address: Republican Party of Cuyahoga County
120 MK Ferguson Plaza
1500 West 3rd Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Chairman: Rob Frost
(216) 621-5415
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. -->
Central Committee Chairwoman:
Sally Florkiewicz
(216) 832-6243
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. --> Executive Committee Chairwoman:
Lucy Stickan
(440) 759-2551
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. --> Executive Director:
Julie Kirk
(216) 621-5417
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. --> Political Director:
Greg Allison
(216) 621-5418
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. --> Member Services Coordinator:
Colin Jackson
(216) 621-5415
\n
--> -->This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. -->
Republican Party of Cuyahoga County


Additional information




--> --> --> 隐私政策 - 迪士尼中国官网
<!--nav end

"迪士尼头像" 登录 注册


隐私政策

一直以来，迪士尼公司都在为全球各地的客户创造精彩的故事、角色和体验，而我们创造的网站和应用程序更是以最好的内容，让客户通过自己喜欢的平台和设备享受娱乐、互相交流。
我们的隐私政策旨在以方便客户浏览、阅读和理解的形式，让大家完全了解我们的隐私做法和原则。我们将谨慎小心地处理您的个人信息。
隐私政策 生效日期：2014/12/18
本隐私政策描述了如何对待发布本隐私政策的网站所提供或收集的信息。本政策还解释了如何对待您在使用我们通过第三方网站或平台推出的应用程序时此类应用程序提供或收集的、已向您披露与应用程序使用相关的信息。我们在公司所在地的地方法规基础上严格遵守本隐私政策。
1. 我们所收集的信息类型 我们收集的信息分为两大基本类型 – 个人信息与匿名信息 – 我们可能会使用个人信息与匿名信息创建第三类信息，汇总信息。 我们收集以下各类信息：
• 当您创建账户时提供的注册信息，包括您的姓名、居住国家、性别、生日、电子邮件地址、用户名及密码；
• 您通过我们的网站或应用程序要求我们提供信息时或从我们购买产品或服务时所提供的交易信息，包括您的通讯地址、电话号码以及支付信息；
• 您在我们网站的公共论坛以及我们的应用程序中提供的信息；
• 在法律允许的信息收集范围内，您使用我们的消息、聊天、发帖等功能或其它类似功能发送的一对一信息或在受限群体内发送的信息；
• 当您使用我们的网站和应用程序、我们在第三方网站或平台上推出的应用程序（如社交网络站点）时所提供的信息，或者您将第三方网站或平台上您的个人资料与您的注册账户进行关联时所提供的信息；
• 在法律允许的信息处理范围内，当您访问我们的网站或使用我们的应用程序时所提供的位置信息，包括移动设备与我们的网站或应用程序之一进行交互时所提供的位置信息或与您的IP地址关联的位置信息；
• 当您访问我们的网站、在第三方网站或平台上使用我们的应用程序或打开我们发送的电子邮件时产生的、包括您设备的识别码或IP地址在内的使用、查看及技术数据。
2. 我们如何收集您的信息 • 当您要求我们提供产品、服务或信息，在我们的网站上注册，加入公共论坛，通过我们的网站和应用程序参加其它活动，在客户调研中提供反馈或通过其它形式与我们进行互动时，我们会收集您提供的信息。请注意，当您通过第三方网站或平台（例如，通过使用我们的应用程序）向我们提供信息时，第三方网站或平台可能会独立收集您提供的信息。本隐私政策适用于我们收集的信息，而第三方网站或平台收集的信息受第三方网站或平台隐私保护条例的约束。您在第三方网站或平台上所作的隐私保护选择将不适用于我们使用通过我们的应用程序直接收集的信息。
• 我们通过相应技术收集信息，例如cookies，Flash cookies以及网络信标等，包括当您访问我们的网站和应用程序或在第三方网站或平台上使用我们的应用程序时我们对信息的收集。请访问在线追踪与广告 ，以便可了解如何禁用cookies等更多的信息。
• 我们会从其它可信的来源获取信息，以便更新或补充您向我们提供或我们自动收集的信息。在我们从第三方获取您的信息前，本地法律可能会要求您授权第三方与我们共享您的信息。
3. 华特迪士尼公司集团对您信息的使用 任何华特迪士尼公司集团的成员公司 ，其中包括多个不同品牌，将成为您个人信息的数据控制方。您可以根据此处确定相关数据控制方。除非适用法律另有规定，华特迪士尼公司集团的其它成员代表数据控制方(作为数据处理方)提供服务时也可以以其自己的名义（作为数据控制方）出于以下目的访问您的个人信息 ：
• 按您的要求提供产品和服务；
• 向您沟通有关您的帐户或与我方之间交易的相关信息，以及向您发送与我们网站和应用程序的功能或与我们政策的修改相关的信息；
• 出于与当地法律以及您享有的选择权与控制权一致的目的；
• 向您发送与我们的产品和服务或与第三方产品和服务有关的优惠及促销信息；
• 在我们的网站上和应用程序中将内容与体验个性化；
• 根据您在我们的网站和应用程序以及在第三方网站和应用程序上的活动为您提供广告；如需进一步
了解我们如何使用您的个人信息进行个性化及追踪，请访问在线追踪与广告；
• 优化或改进我们的产品、服务及运营；
• 监测、调查或防止违反我公司政策或违法的活动。
4. 与其它公司共享您的信息 我们不会在华特迪士尼公司集团的范围之外分享您的个人信息 ， 但以下受限情形除外，包括：
• 当您允许我们与其它公司共享您的信息时，例如：
• 选择与经过精心挑选的公司共享您的个人信息，这样这些公司可以向您发送与其产品和服务有关的优惠及促销信息；
• 指示我们与第三方网站或平台共享您的个人信息，例如社交网络等；
请注意，如果我们与其它公司共享您的个人信息，这一公司所获得的信息将受其隐私保护条例的约束。
• 当我们与金融机构合作向您推出联名产品或服务时，例如我们的联名迪士尼积分维萨卡；然而，我们只会在相应法律允许的范围内共享您的个人信息，在
这种情形下，金融机构禁止出于联名产品或服务以外的其它目的使用您的个人信息。
• 当其它公司代表我们提供包裹递送、客户服务等相关服务时；然而，此类公司严禁出于我们要求或法律允许以外的其它目的使用您的个人信息。
• 当我们在业务销售时需要与第三方共享个人信息，以执行“使用条款”或相关规定，确保访客与第三方的安全及保障，保护我们的权利以及访客与第三方
的权利和资产并且同时遵守相关法律程序；或者在其它情形下如果我们真诚地认为法律要求进行此类信息的披露。
5. 您的控制权与选择权 对于收集、使用、共享您的信息来说，我们赋予您进行一定控制与选择的权利。在遵守当地法律的基础上，您的控制权与选择权可包括：
• 您可以更正、更新并删除您的注册账户；
• 您可以修改您选择的订阅信息、新闻消息和提醒；
• 您可以选择是否接收我们提供的产品及服务的优惠和促销信息或我们认为您可能会感兴趣的产品和服务信息；
• 您可以选择我们是否可以与其它公司共享您的个人信息，如允许分享，则此类公司可向您发送与其产品和服务有关的优惠与促销信息；
• 您可以选择是否接收来自多个广告网络、数据交换、营销分析以及其它服务提供商的定向广告，只要点击本链接 [www.aboutads.info/choices]；
• 您可以要求查阅我们所保存关于您的个人信息并要求我们对其进行修改和删除，亦可让我们要求与我们分享此类信息的第三方进行此类修改与删除。
您可以来联系访客服务，或按照通过各类沟通渠道向您提供的说明进行操作，便可行使您的控制权与选择权。请注意，如果您不允许我们收集您的个人信息，我们可能无法为您提供某些产品和服务，同时我们在提供一些服务时也无法将您的兴趣与喜好考虑在内。对于我们处理或保留的有关您的具体个人信息，如果您有任何问题，请联系访客服务。
6. 儿童隐私 我们认为有必要对于通过我们的网站以及应用程序从儿童 那里收集来的个人信息 提供进一步的隐私保护。我们对网站和应用程序提供的一些功能进行了年龄分级，因此儿童无法使用这些功能，而我们也不会刻意从儿童那里收集与这些功能相关的个人信息。当我们有意从儿童那里收集个人信息时，我们将会采取额外的步骤来保护儿童的隐私权，其中包括：
• 通知父母有关儿童的信息守则，包括我们从儿童那里可能收集的个人信息类别、我们对信息的使用、以及我们是否和与谁分享上述信息；
• 在遵守适用法律的基础上从儿童那里收集个人信息或直接向儿童发送有关我们产品的信息时征求父母的同意；
• 限制我们从儿童那里收集个人信息的行为不超过参与在线活动所需的合理、必要的范围；
• 允许父母查阅从其未成年子女那里收集的个人信息，并有权要求将之更改或删除。
如需进一步了解我们在美国及拉丁美洲的儿童个人信息管理，请阅读我们的儿童隐私政策。
[http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/kids.html]
7. 数据安全性、完整性和保留 对于我们来说，保证您信息的安全性、完整性以及保密性至关重要。我们已经采用了专门为保护访客信息不受非授权访问、披露、使用以及修改而设计的技术、行政管理及实质安全措施。我们还会不时审查我们的安全程序，考虑采用相应的新技术与方法。 请注意，尽管我们尽全力保护相关信息，但是任何安全措施都不是完美或不可突破的。我们将在实现本隐私政策中所述目的所需的期限内保留您的个人信息，除非法律要求或允许在更长的期限内保留该信息。
8. 数据的全球传输、存储以及处理 我们的业务运营遍布全球，因此可能会出于本隐私政策中所描述的目的将您的个人信息发送给世界各地的华特迪士尼公司集团的某些成员公司或第三方。无论我们在何处传输、存储或处理了您的个人信息-，我们均会通过合理的步骤来保证您个人信息的隐私安全。此外，当使用或披露从欧盟传输来的个人信息时，我们将遵守美国商业部制定的《国际安全港隐私保护原则》，使用欧盟委员会批准的标准合同条款，采用其它欧盟法律就充分保护隐私所规定的其它方法或获得您的同意。在传输来自澳大利亚的个人信息时，我们还会执行《国际安全港隐私保护原则》中的实质要求。
9. 对本隐私政策的修订 为确保本隐私政策能够符合新的技术、业界实践标准以及监管要求或实现其它目的，我们会不时地对本隐私政策进行修订。如果更改是重要的，我们将向您发送通知；如果适用法律有所要求，我们将获得您的同意。
10. 评论与问题 如果您有关于此隐私政策的意见或问题，请联系访客服务。我们的网站和应用可能包含指向非由我们所有或控制的其他网站，我们对于这些网站的隐私做法概不负责。我们建议您在离开我们的网站或应用时了解这一点，并阅读可能收集您个人信息的其他网站的隐私政策。
加利福尼亚州居民注意事项：如果您是加州居民，《加利福尼亚州民法典》(California Civil Code) 第 1798.83 节允许您请求获得迪士尼及其旗下公司与关联公司的某些成员向第三方披露您的个人信息以用于第三方的直接营销目的的相关信息。有关更多信息，请访问我们的加利福尼亚州隐私政策页面。
定义 汇总信息 汇总信息指与访客群体或类别有关的信息，此类信息不能确认并且也无法合理地用于确认访客的个人身份。
匿名信息 匿名信息指不能直接或间接确认且无法合理地用于确认访客个人身份的信息。
应用程序 应用程序指由我们（或以我们的名义）运营且可能在多个在线、手机或其它平台及环境上展示的程序或服务，包括由第三方运营的且允许我们直接与我们的访客进行互动的平台和环境。
儿童 儿童指我们确认的个人尚未达到法定年龄，可允许向其收集和处理个人信息。在美国与拉丁美洲，“儿童”一词指年龄在13周岁以下的个人。
数据控制方 数据控制方指华特迪士尼公司集团的下属或附属实体，此类实体负责从网站及应用程序中收集个人信息，上述网站与应用程序如下所示：
• Disney Club Penguin (“Club Penguin”)
Disney Canada Inc. (formerly known as Disney Online Studios Canada Inc.)
Club Penguin
1628 Dickson Avenue, Suite 500
Kelowna, British Columbia V1Y 9X1
CANADA
support@clubpenguin.com
• All other sites and applications
If you live in Europe:
The Walt Disney Company Limited
(Company Number 530051)
3 Queen Caroline Street
Hammersmith
London
W6 9PE
help@disney.co.uk
US, Canada and Rest of World:
Disney Interactive
500 South Buena Vista Street
Mail Code 7667
Burbank, CA 91521-7667
United States of America
Guest Services
数据处理方 数据处理方指代表一个或多个数据控制方处理个人信息的个人或实体 ，数据处理方只能遵守数据控制方的指示对数据进行处理。
IP地址 IP地址与您进入互联网的接入点关联，并且一般由您的互联网服务供应商（ISP）、公司或大学控制。我们可能会使用IP地址来收集访客访问我们网站和应用程序各个部分的频率，我们可能会结合使用IP地址与个人信息。
成员公司 成员公司指华特迪士尼公司集团的下属或附属实体。
通知 通知可能会以电子邮件的形式发送至您最后一次向我们提供的电子邮件地址，在我们的网站和应用程序中以布告形式公布修订，或以其它符合适用法律的形式发送。
父母 父母指双亲之一或法定监护人。
个人信息 个人信息指可以用于（直接或间接）确定某一特定个人身份的信息，例如个人的姓名、通讯地址、电子邮件地址和电话号码等。当匿名信息直接或间接关联到个人信息时，此类匿名信息将被视为个人信息。
公共论坛 我们的网站和应用程序可能会提供留言板、聊天页、博客、聊天室、社交社区环境 、个人资料页以及其它不对参与者进行限制的论坛。如果您在使用任何上述功能时提供了个人信息，此类个人信息可能会被公开发布或以其它形式披露，我方或第三方可不受限制使用此类信息。如欲请求从我们的某个网站或应用程序的某个公共论坛中移除您的个人信息，请联系访客服务。
华特迪士尼公司集团 华特迪士尼公司集团指华特迪士尼公司以及提供其不同品牌产品和服务的下属与附属实体。这些公司涉及多种业务领域，包括主题公园和旅游、电影电视、出版、消费产品、互动服务等。华特迪士尼公司的品牌包括但不限于以下所列各项：
• ABC
• Babble
• Baby Einstein
• BabyZone
• Club Penguin
• Disney
• Disney Pixar
• ESPN
• Hollywood Records
• Indiana Jones
• Lucasfilm
• Marvel
• Muppets
• Playdom
• Spoonful
• Star Wars
• Tapulous
• Touchstone
访客服务”联系信息 访客服务
Disney Interactive
500 South Buena Vista Street
Mail Code 7667
Burbank, CA 91521-7667
United States of America (美国)
发送邮件至访客服务[ms_support@help.go.com]
如需有关于儿童隐私保护的问题，请致电“访客服务部”，电话(877) 466-6669。
Disney Interactive 已在美国获得 TRUSTe 隐私标志，表示本隐私政策和我们的隐私做法已通过审查，符合 TRUSTe 计划的要求，单击 TRUSTe 隐私标志即可前往认证页面查看其中列出的计划内容。TRUSTe 计划仅涵盖认证页面上确认的那些所有物。如果您认为 Disney Interactive 未回复您的问题，或不满意问题的解决方式，则可以通过此处与 TRUSTe 联系，或者通过此处提供的在线消费者投诉表，与美国贸易委员会联系。
关注迪士尼新浪微博 关注迪士尼微信

关于迪士尼 联系我们 加入我们 法律条款 隐私政策 退换货政策 问题反馈 网站地图
©Disney.All rights reserved ICP  备案号 ：沪B2-20040339-3
-->

The Rise and Fall of .Ly <!-- start Mixpanel

The Rise and Fall of .Ly

Oct 23, 2015 · 17,557 views

Share
Tweet
Azaz, Syria, 2012 (Christiaan Triebert)
In 2012, the US imposed sanctions on Syria, for, among other things, their occupation of Lebanon, their apparent support for terrorist groups, and an intent to pursue weapons of mass destruction. One Slate reporter pointed out that this meant bad news, not for the Syrian people, but for a little startup called Artsy.
Artsy -- a social platform for sharing and purchasing art -- occupied the domain Art.sy. The “.sy” in the URL is the country code for Syria. .Sy domains are ultimately registered with and purchased from a Syrian Internet authority. Although Artsy had registered Art.sy in 2011, before sanctions were imposed, Artsy’s annual payments to maintain the domain meant they were breaking sanctions.
This was an accident, of course. As the CEO wrote to the Slate reporter, Artsy chose the domain because it, “perfectly captures Art.sy's mission and accessible character, and is the shortest english spell-able domain that begins with the word 'art' making it perfect for sharing on social networks.”
“To call your company by that name, it’s cute,” sanctions specialist Mark Dubowitz told Slate, “but it’s not that cute when you consider the country whose name you are using is responsible for killing Americans.”
Soon after, Art.sy changed its url to Artsy.net (a change that cost them “under $50,000.”)
Syria is by no means alone as a complicated country in control of a catchy .com alternative. Montenegro is responsible for .me addresses -- popular for personal portfolios, and also with Facebook, which now owns fb.me. Libya licenses every url that ends in .ly: embed.ly, crowd.ly, Adf.ly, Ow.ly, and all the the “bit.ly” links shortened by Bit.ly. 
The nation of Tuvalu licensed their suffix, “.tv”, to Verisign in exchange for $10 million up front, and $2.2 million annually. That annual fee makes up about 10% of the small island government’s total revenue. Tuvalu’s government has literally paved their streets with domain name money. The coincidence that their country name’s international abbreviation is an English-language pun has become, arguably, their most valuable resource.
How did such a system come about? And is it here to stay?
The God of the Internet
Jon Postel (Carl Malamud)
Until 1998, the Internet had a “God.” His name was Jon Postel.
Postel was a computer science student at UCLA in the late 1960s. In 1969, he got into the Internet more or less on the ground floor, when he was part of the team that set up the first node of the ARPANET -- which would lay the technological groundwork for the modern Internet.
In these early days, computers would refer to each other and the files on them by IP address. The earliest web addresses were strings of numbers, like: 123.45.67.89. If you wanted to reference, access, or communicate with a computer, you’d type in its numerical address. As the ARPANET grew, its moderators compiled a single file mapping memorable names, often pronounceable strings of characters, to IP addresses. This file was named “HOSTS.TXT", and it was like a giant phone book with every computer’s name and number in it. Hosts made copies of the master HOSTS.TXT. This system got more and more cumbersome as the network got bigger and bigger.
In 1983, ARPANET became a subnet of the early Internet. At around the same time, Postel, along with computer scientist Paul Mockapetris, devised a new system to name the various places of the web. Their invention, called the Domain Name System (DNS), took the role of the HOSTS.TXT file and distributed it across an eventually vast, multifaceted network of servers.
Part of this involved sectioning off all the addresses in the network into top-level domains. A top level domain (TLD) is designated by the last characters of a URL.
Some TLDs, like .com and .net, were made open for anyone to register, historically on a first-come, first-served basis. Others were more restricted. .org, for example, was originally intended just for non-profit institutions (though this restriction has since been lifted), and .edu for educational institutions (this restriction has since been narrowed to US-based 4-year accredited institutions).
IANA Logo
It was also decided that some top level domains would correspond to the geographic location of a computer. These are known as country code top level domains. The first of these country code TLDs were: .us (US), .uk (UK), and .il (Israel) in 1985, followed by .au (Australia), .de (Germany), .fi (Finland), .fr (France), .jp (Japan), .kr (Korea), .nl (Nederlands) and .se (Sweden). All the countries the International Standards Organization listed in the ISO-3166 got their own domain, provided there was an appropriate entity to claim authority over it.
Registration of restricted TLDs and of country code TLDs was governed by organizations called domain name registries -- these registries could either act as registrars or delegate the task to other entities. Before 1998, the task of appointing registries fell to Jon Postel, who headed the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). As Postel wrote in 1994:
“The IANA is not in the business of deciding what is and what is not a country. The selection of the ISO 3166 list as a basis for country code top-level domain names was made with the knowledge that ISO has a procedure for determining which entities should be and should not be on that list.”
Jon Postel passed away in 1998, but the system he stewarded lived on. Authority over many of his former duties was passed onto the newly-formed nonprofit: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
The Rise and Fall of .Ly
Libya doesn’t have any more to do with adverbs than the next country (Abdul Jawad-Elhusuni)
Many of these mundane little country code TLDs mask histories of geopolitical intrigue. Some of these have been collected by James Bridle as a project at Citizen-Ex. In the project’s description, Bridle highlights an often-overlooked fact about the Internet:
“[T]he internet is very real, and very solid: a world-wide infrastructure of computers, cables, routers - and people. And that infrastructure means it’s connected to real places, with real territory, real citizens, and real politics.”
No TLD illustrates this better than .ly -- the TLD for the North African nation of Libya. As the suffix for most English-language adverbs, it’s quite popular. The allure of a punchy domain, in an age when most reasonable .coms were already taken, even inspired a trend of adverbial startup names: Embed.ly, Crowd.ly, Ow.ly, Bit.ly. 
In 1997, the IANA under Postel granted authority for .ly to somebody named Kalil Elwiheshi. Despite actually residing in England, Elwiheshi provided, with his application, an address in Tripoli, Libya’s capital. At the time, the IANA did not have the resources to find Elwiheshi out, so he became the technical manager of .ly’s registry.
“A British company [...] acted as collector of registration fees for .ly,” Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace documents, “which it split with [Elwiheshi]. Such arrangements were not at all uncommon with other developing country ccTLDs.”
In April 2004, some 12,400 domains ending in .ly disappeared. The British company managing it had disappeared, too, and for a time nobody knew what to do. According to Bridle, “some but not all” of the domains came back online within a few days, and one “Dr. Hosni Tayeb” sent a cryptic email to all domain holders communicating, in broken English, that everything was fine: “Thank you very much for your concern about .ly cc TLD. People do care around!"
Everything was obviously not fine. Seeing an opportunity, later that year the General Posts and Telecommunications Company (GPTC) applied with ICANN to take over the registry, with the blessings of the Libyan government and the “Internet community” of Libya. ICANN approved the change in authority.
But as neither Libya’s government nor its position in the global balance of power has been stable since 2004, the .ly TLD hasn’t been exactly stable either.
Violet Blue, in a tank top (Violet Blue)
GPTC’s actions as the registry of .ly offer a good illustration of the possible power it affords. Even though a government cannot go in an and remove the content of a site, if they revoke its URL, nobody can find it anymore. In 2010, vb.ly -- a domain owned by “sex-positive url-shortener” Violet Blue -- was removed from the .ly registry, on the grounds that it had violated Libyan law and the terms of its registration. As their letter explained:
"Pornography and adult material aren't allowed under Libyan law, therefore we removed the domain. […] The issue of offensive imagery is quite subjective, as what I may deem as offensive you might not, but I think you'll agree that a picture of a scantily clad lady with some bottle in her hand isn't exactly what most would consider decent or family friendly at the least."
The image the letter refers to was a photo of writer and San Francisco-based sex columnist Violet Blue in a tank top, drinking a beer.
GPTC was run by President Muammar Gaddafi’s eldest son, Muhammad Gaddafi. According to New Media, Old Regimes: Case Studies in Comparative Communication Law and Policy:
“The Gaddafi family was essentially the gatekeeper of the Internet Libya. This made it easy for the regime to use the telecommunications system to censor all kinds of content that had the potential of threatening the regime.”
Then, in 2011, civil war broke out in Libya. One of the main registrars of .ly addresses, Libyan Spider, was shut down, apparently as part of UN/US sanctions on Libya. For a time, the owners of Libyan Spider were only able to revive these urls by leaving the country.
The start-up Letter.ly also announced that it had gone down because it had let its domain registration expire, and it could not establish contact with the registrar to renew it’s contract. “Sorry for the hassle,” they wrote in an email to their users. “it’s amazing that a physical war has affected our service in this way.”
Muammar Gaddafi, President of Libya (deceased)
Another thing that happened, in the fray of the war, was the Libyan government shutdown the internet. In response to worry that every Bitly-shortened link would soon no longer work, Bitly’s CEO explained that there were five authoritative root servers for .ly -- only two of which were in Libya. Others pointed out that even this did not entirely insulate bit.ly from the situation in Libya. From readwrite: 
“[T]he servers outside of Libya are still reliant - eventually - on obtaining updates from the .ly registry within the country. ‘If they are unable to succeed in getting updates, at some point they will consider the data they have stale and stop providing information on the .LY domain.’”
Readwrite’s expert said it would take about 28 days without an update to shut .ly down. The point was that even if Bitly didn’t fail then -- which it didn’t -- had the situation in Libya been a little bit different, it certainly could have.
Today, Libya’s government is still disputed. Access to the different domains is split between two competing governments. As Khaled Esheh, the technical manager of the .ly registry, told Bridle: "The government domains are distributed between the two parties and it depends on who has the password which allows them to change the details of the domain."
Maybe because of this instability, or maybe because adverbs have simply passed out of fashion in the fast-changing world of start-up names, .ly seems to be on its way out. While .ly domains are still being registered, they’ve flattened out considerably since 2011:
.Ly registrations, Rosie Cima, Priceonomics; data via BostInno
The Rise of .Io and .Me
Late last year, ICANN made a move that they hoped would help the whole economy of TLD registration make a little more sense. They introduced hundreds of new, generic TLDs, in several different languages, to the system. Now, if you register with the group that has bought authority over the TLD, you can have a website with a URL ending in .help, .photos, .tennis, .rich, or .sex.
But don’t let the ebb of .ly fool you. Even with this shift, the age of country code TLD-based domain hacks is by no means over, as some of these two-letter codes are just too good to ignore. In December of 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Vujica Lazovic noted that his newly-formed nation of Montenegro had brought in $15 million by licensing out domains ending in .me since they put them on the market in 2006. .Me addresses are popular for personal websites, especially those built with Flavors.me, but Facebook has also bought fb.me.
Another rising star is .io. Introduced in 1998, .io addresses now comprise 0.1% of all websites, including close.io, outbound.io, github.io, and card.io. There are lots of reasons for the popularity: .io is pronounceable, an acronym for “input/output”, a visual pun on 1 and 0. Io’s registry is based in the British Indian Ocean Territory. As Russell Beattie wrote of the TLD in 2013: 
“The .io ending is just fantastic - it sounds great, and almost no one will associate .io with any specific country. Though the fact that it's for the British Indian Ocean Territory - and thus under stable British rule - is great as well, especially compared with Libya's .ly domain.”
James Bridle, who wrote and compiled the Citizen-Ex stories, is of a different opinion. Britain’s history of colonialism over the 1,000+ tiny islands that make up the British Indian Ocean Territory is complex, and it isn’t clear where the registry money is going nor whom it benefits. The native population was ‘evicted’ in the 1960s and 1970s, and remained exiled despite continuous efforts to return. Right now, the only people who live there are a couple thousand British and US military personnel.
Aerial view of one of the islands, Diego Garcia, showing military base.
“.Io is a place, but you can’t go there,” Bridle writes, “unless you’re serving in the military, sailing your own yacht, or in chains. The only way the rest of us can reach it is through the Internet.”
Like Libya, the British Indian Ocean Territory is another example of how a cool-sounding abbreviation in a URL can mask a complex situation in the real world. And there are dangers to that. The more obscure countries of the world are selling their names away as branding tools. In such a system, it’s easy to lose sight of the very real geographic and political dimensions to a domain name.
Our next post examines how much urine splashes back on you when you use a urinal. To get notified when we post it →  join our email list.
This post was written by Rosie Cima. You can follow her on Twitter here.

Data. Longform Content. Analysis.
Priceonomics.

Get notified when we write something new.

More Posts from Priceonomics to Read

comments powered by Disqus

Woah. We are flattered you shared our blog post!

If you want to be notified when we write a "halfway decent" blog post in the future, leave your email here below.

-->

2 comments:

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)